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Useful by Nature, Defensive on Demand: Topography and Sieges of Rome in the Gothic War

By Peter Guevara

Guevara 1
The wars of Justinian during the 6th century AD were ambitious military endeavors that
were meant to restore the glory of the Roman Empire. To achieve the goal of restoring the
former Roman west to Roman (Byzantine) control, Justinian began with an offensive against the
North African Vandals in 533, sent Belisarius to lead the army, and achieved victory by 534
AD.1 Shortly thereafter, Justinian sent Belisarius to reconquer the Italian Peninsula. He
conquered Sicily within a year and proceeded to invade the Italian mainland. He and his forces
fought their way to Rome, entering through the Porta Asinaria just as the Gothic garrison was
departing through the Porta Flaminia. Rome, however, presented a quandary to Belisarius.
Rome, which was once the nexus of the Roman world, was a shadow of its former self: The
population had shrunk and locals were not entirely sympathetic to Belisarius or his cause, but
Belisarius had to both protect them and defend the city.2
The scholars who have studied the siege of Rome in 537 – 538 AD and the AD 540’s
treat different aspects of the siege but have not assessed other topographical elements.
Christopher Lillington-Martin addresses Procopius’ depiction of the Goths’ crossing of a river
with regard to the topographical and landscape implications for the siege of Rome.3 Averil
Cameron examines the siege of Rome within the context of the logistical struggle that the
“reconquest” of Justinian often faced.4 A.D. Lee discusses the weapons used by Belisarius during
the siege of Rome, the broader picture of warfare in the time of Justinian, and the impact of wars
on the affected communities.5 Lastly, J.B. Bury provides a narrative of the sieges of Rome but
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does not investigate everything that happens inside or outside the city.6 Thus, there is a dearth in
the assessment of the city elements that made it defendable.
This paper will investigate how Belisarius and the Byzantines defended the city by
repurposing the topographical elements of the city and its surrounding areas to keep the Gothic
forces, led by the Gothic king Wittigis in 536 – 537 and later his successor Totila in 546 – 547
and 549 from taking the city. The defense of Rome included not only safeguarding the walls of
the city but also keeping the non-combatants inside safe and well-treated. An analysis of
Belisarius’ defense will require analysis of Procopius’ literary account of the siege of Rome
since he was present in Rome for the siege. Other evidence will be archaeological, cartographical
and topographical for the purposes of demonstrating what parts of Rome were used for the
defense of the city. Thus it will be argued that the city by its topographic nature, natural and
artificial, defended itself but Belisarius used that nature to better defend the city. The paper will
address how Belisarius utilized the Tiber River, the outside surroundings of Rome, the Aurelian
Walls, and the existing structures to defend the city and how Totila worked against those
defenses.
The Surroundings of Rome
Defending Rome in 536 AD also involved indirect defense of the city by controlling
points in the vicinity of Rome. These especially included points north of the city. Belisarius’
wanted to maintain control of these cities north of Rome because they were near roads important
to Rome. The Via Flaminia and Via Salaria were two of those important road networks and both
roads led straight to Rome. Main strategic differences between the two are that the route through
the Via Flaminia would have placed the Gothic Army at the Milvian Bridge which crosses the
Tiber whereas the Via Salaria places the Goths at an unknown bridge which Lillington-Martin
6
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claims is the Salarian Bridge.7 This development was critical because the defenders under the
command of Belisarius would not be able to withstand a full assault on the walls of Rome.
Given that the forces defending the city were outnumbered 3 to 1 by the besieging army,
open battle was not exactly a viable option; selected, pitched battles were. Procopius describes an
episode in the early stages of the siege when Belisarius rode out of the city to reconnoiter a
bridge that he had fortified with towers and a garrison near the Via Salaria. To his chagrin, he
surprisingly encountered enemy forces recently arrived from Ravenna. It was in this engagement
in February 537 that Belisarius first learned of the major advantage he held over the Goths: He
had mounted archers at his disposal whereas the Goths only had mounted spearmen, infantry,
and archers that only fought with the cover of the cavalry.8 E.A. Thompson finds it surprising
that Belisarius only learned about his opponents’ military sources in that encounter.9 Belisarius
was able to utilize his newfound knowledge immediately. He ordered 200 mounted archers to
seize a hill not too far from the Salarian Gate and to fight the enemy with only their bows; they
were to return to the city as soon as they had depleted their ammunition. They executed this
order and caused great destruction for the enemy.10 This engagement outside the Salarian Gate
revealed two things: First, the Romans possessed a weapons advantage that the natural
surroundings augmented. Second, Procopius reveals that Belisarius retained control over the
gates and thus over the city.
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The importance of defending from within rather from without is best shown in the sorties
made by the defenders at various points during the siege. When Belisarius engaged the enemy
outside the walls, it was often because the people of Rome beckoned him to do so. In doing so,
he pitted his smaller but more mobile force against a larger force. Such was the case in Spring
537 AD when he led a bulk of his forces out of the city against the whole host of Wittigis’ army:
There was initial success but eventually the Romans were forced to retreat towards the walls.11
Afterwards, Belisarius and his forces resorted only to chosen battles with cavalry and unexpected
sorties.12
On another occasion in the spring of 537 AD, Belisarius sent a force led by Martinus and
Valerianus to engage the Goths on the Plain of Nero just north of the Mausoleum of Hadrian.
Procopius’ account is the only known literary source that refers to this region of Rome.13
Procopius remarks, however, that the Goths held an advantage over the Romans in this region.14
The area once hosted gladiatorial combat and there were narrow passages all around it too.15
Combining that aspect of the area and the larger numbers of the enemy, it becomes clear why the
Romans were at a disadvantage when fighting outside the city walls.
Natural Defense and Resource
The Tiber River itself was a topographical feature that aided in the defense of the city
and one which Belisarius utilized. One feature was that it formed a natural boundary between
Rome and the some of the areas occupied by the besiegers; in that regard, it would also separate
parts of Rome, but Belisarius and his men still retained control over the bridges of Rome. The
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river also bounded a section of the Aurelian Wall closest to the Mausoleum. One of the major
drawbacks, however, was that the Romans no longer had access to potable water because the
Gothic forces had severed the aqueducts. The city’s residents were forced to draw water from
wells and the river but clean water could not be provided to the city through the river because it
was where all the waste of the city drained.16
A secondary feature of the Tiber River was its ability to provide power to makeshift corn
mills. Since the aqueducts no longer provided water to the city, the people could not produce
bread as they usually did. Bury writes that this particular event showed the “inventive genius of
Belisarius.”17 To circumvent this problem in the early stages of the siege, Belisarius set up
floating mills on the Tiber River which were powered by the flow of the river under the Aurelian
Bridge.18 This enabled the making of bread in the city and allowed for the sustaining of the city.
Belisarius also set up protection for the floating mills so that they would be safe from the debris
and bodies that would disrupt the mills and so that the city would be safe from invasion via the
river.19
The Ports of Rome
Both the Byzantine and Gothic forces recognized the importance of maintaining access to
the sea. Belisarius worked to maintain provisions for the city, which was 126 stades away from
Portus.20 Food meant for Rome came via ship and then overland on the Via Portuensis. This was
critical for the survival of Rome’s inhabitants and defenders because the siege was stretching
their resources thin. Belisarius and the Byzantine army had sufficient recourse to supply via
Portus during the first several months of the siege. Procopius notes that this enabled the
16
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defenders to essentially supply themselves at will but this captured the attention of the Gothic
king: “[Vittigis], seeing that the enemy were enjoying a large degree of freedom, not only in
taking out of the city whatever they wished, but also in bringing in provisions both by land and
sea, decided to seize the harbour, which the Romans call “Portus.”The seizure of Portus created a
logistical quandary for the Byzantine army. With Portus no longer available, Belisarius had to
rely on the old port of Ostia and the road that led from it to Rome. Furthermore, the supply line
of the Byzantine army was forced to come out as far as Antium (modern-day Anzio). Belisarius
did not wish to send a garrison to Portus because he was concerned for the wall circuit and thus
left
The Walls of Rome
The Aurelian Walls, built in the latter half of the 3rd century AD, were Belisarius’
primary line of defense. According to the Liber Pontificalis, a source from the late 6th century
AD, Belisarius repaired the walls of the city in preparation for the siege of Wittigis.21 CoatesStephens describes succinctly what Belisarius did to defend the city: “On his arrival in the city in
December 536, Belisarius overhauled the defences in preparation for the siege: he dug a ditch
around the circuit, fitted anti-siege machinery, and rebuilt the merlons.”22 Procopius writes that
he blocked up the Flaminian Gate, shutting off that part of the circuit for entry and exit. He did
this while keeping open gates at other parts of the wall circuit, thus showing his control over who
came in and went out of the city.23
The expanse of the Aurelian Walls aided Belisarius in his defense of Rome. The circuit of
the Aurelian Walls was 12 to 13 miles in circumference, thus making Rome a very large city to

21
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attack or defend. On the one hand the defenders had to defend an area is a great distance to cover
for both the besiegers and the besieged. 24 Since the defenders under Belisarius were
outnumbered by the forces of Wittigis, this put Belisarius and his men at an even greater
disadvantage. Cameron makes note of this lack of numbers, which is a common thread
throughout the wars of Justinian.25 Procopius writes that the Goths, coming from the north, set up
six camps on the left bank of the Tiber so that they might threaten at least five gates of the city.
Lillington-Martin identifies these as being in a specific area “east of the Tiber, south of the Anio
and north and east of the Aurelian Walls.”26 The Goths also set up a camp in the Plain of Nero
on the right bank of the Tiber so that they might also assault the northwest side of the city.27 This
particular arrangement allowed Belisarius to focus on the northern gates of the city, giving him
and his army a chance to fight more effectively.28
Procopius writes about an interesting section of the Aurelian Wall which does not feature
heavily in the broader narrative of the Gothic Wars. This happens to be the “Περίβολον
Διεππωγότα,” or “Broken Wall.” Procopius describes this wall section and its history in the
Wars:
And between this gate and the small gate next on the right, which
is called the Pincian, a certain portion of the wall had split open of
its own accord in ancient times, not clear to the ground, however,
but about half way down, but still it had not fallen or been
otherwise destroyed, though it leaned so to either side that one part

24
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of it appeared outside the rest of the wall and the other inside. And
from this circumstance the Romans from ancient times have the
place “Broken Wall” in their own tongue.29
Procopius further wrote that “Belisarius in the beginning undertook to tear down this portion and
rebuild it, the Romans prevented him, declaring that the Apostle Peter had promised them that he
would care for the guarding of the wall there.”30 This particular section, being a major cause of
concern for the defenders, was not breached at any point in the siege. Procopius wrote that it
never did cross either the Romans’ nor the Goths’ minds to pay attention to this break in the
wall. Procopius also remarked that this section of the circuit remained as such at the time of his
writing.31 That is to say that the “Broken Wall” endured three sieges of Rome but was only
worthy of one reference during the first siege levied on Rome during the Gothic Wars.
Re-purposed Edifications
One interesting case of re-purposing during the course of the siege was the use of the
Mausoleum of Hadrian to defend against the Gothic invaders. Procopius notes that this particular
section was not heavily garrisoned because of the river. A key aspect of Hadrian’s Mausoleum is
that it was an artificial hill and fortress; in its monumentality, this resting place of Roman
emperors became a high ground for the defenders of the city. Procopius also comments that the
tomb seemed to be a fortress so it was further enclosed by the defenders with walls extending
from the Aurelian circuit. This spot was of particular importance to the defenders because it was
situated adjacent to the Tiber River, which the Goths were not able to control, and a gate into the
city was situated nearby. The Aurelian Wall also ran along the side of the river across from the
Mausoleum, which is a reason why Belisarius placed a small garrison there under the command
29
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of Constantinus. 32 Procopius writes that the defenders used the statues that adorned the edges of
the base as projectiles to hurl at the Gothic forces.33 That being said, the only major action that
Belisarius did with regard to the Mausoleum of Hadrian is appoint Constantinus as its garrison
commander since the Mausoleum (being a fortress) and the river gave the enemy no room to
maneuver against the Aurelian Wall.
When the Goths severed the aqueducts prior to the beginning of the siege, they created a
defensive nightmare for Belisarius. Belisarius blocked up these newly formed routes into the
city, lest the Goths engage in the same thing that he had done when he captured Naples in 536
AD.34 A few members of the Gothic forces traversed a small section of the broken aqueduct line
under the Pincian Hill in an effort to infiltrate the city during a truce period.35 One of Belisarius’
men had reputedly seen a flicker of light from a section where a shaft connected the tunnel to the
surface, but other guards dismissed it as light reflected in the eyes of a wolf. Belisarius, being
wary, kept the spot under close attention. This happens to be the only instance in which the
aqueducts are threatened during the siege, but it reflects Belisarius’ involvement with the
surroundings of Rome.
End of the First Siege of Rome
The siege did not end with the destruction of the Gothic army but rather with the opening
of another front when John besieged Rimini.36 Wittigis lifted his siege of Rome in order to
relieve Rimini and protect his capital city Ravenna. Belisarius sent his forces after the departing
Goths, taking down many of them as they fled. A bridge along the Via Salaria played a part in

32
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the flight of the Goths, which was also a significant part of their route coming down to Rome at
the outset of the siege according to Lillington-Martin.37 The topography lent itself to the defense
of Rome, but it had to be harnessed in order to effectively fend off the Goths. Rome’s natural and
the manmade features contributed just as much to the defense of the city as the soldiers
defending it. Belisarius took an active role in the conduct of the siege as one might expect out of
a good general.38 The Aurelian Walls and its gates were utilized by Belisarius because they
allowed him to control who could come into the city or not, as well as whether or not it was
necessary for the defenders to make sorties against the besiegers. Some of the areas outside the
city walls were viable for pitching battles, but the open field did not always favor the forces of
Belisarius. The natural border and resource of the river was invaluable to the survival of the
defenders. When combined with Belisarius’ handiwork at the Aurelian Bridge, the Aurelian
Walls on the edge of the river, and the Mausoleum of Hadrian, the river itself was wellprotected. Belisarius indeed achieved a successful first defense of Rome.
Unlocking Ravenna: Build-up to the Siege of Ravenna
Geographic and topographic control also factored into the conduct of a siege. John,
another general in the Byzantine army, was responsible for seizing and besieging two cities in
the region of Picenum according to Procopius: Auximus and Urbinus. The account of Procopius
shows that he assessed the situation at both cities. He, however, elected not to follow those
orders on account of its strength. He instead marched on the city of Rimini, thus directly
disobeying the orders of Belisarius. Procopius attributes this dereliction of duty not to a
misguided sense of glory seeking or to forgetfulness, but to John’s rationale that an attack levied

37
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on a location near Ravenna—Rimini—would cause the Gothic forces to lift their siege of
Rome.39 He summarily marched into Rimini without resistance from the Goths and held the city.
With Goths driven from the walls of Rome, Belisarius diverted his attention to aiding
John in the struggle for Rimini. Belisarius ordered two of his men, Martinus and Ildiger, to travel
up the peninsula to Rimini with their men. Procopius wrote that they had beaten the Goths to
their final destination on account of the actions undertaken by Belisarius earlier in the war; the
Gothic forces traveling north along the Via Flaminia tried to avoid the fortresses at Narnia,
Spolitium, and Perusia and subsequently went by longer routes to Rimini. These are the same
fortresses which Bessas and Constantinus sieged and garrisoned prior to the first siege of Rome.
This episode of the Wars illustrates that the fortresses were elements of the terrain for which the
Goths had circumvent. The fortresses are not part of the natural landscape but by means of
Byzantine occupation they are co-opted into the topography of Italy.40
On their way to Rimini, Martinus and Ildiger encountered a Gothic force stationed at a
fortress in Petra, which Procopius called an “incident of the expedition.”41This fortress, however,
was more natural in its constitution than other topographical elements discussed thus far. The
account rendered by Procopius states that there was road—a man-made road built by the Roman
Emperor Vespasian in 76 A.D. —but the surrounding region was mountainous. Procopius relates
the difficulty of navigating the area:
On the right of this road a river descends which no man can ford because of the
swiftness of the current, and on the left not far away rises a sheer rock which
reaches to such a height that men who might chance to be standing on its summit,
as seen by those below, resemble in size the smallest birds. And in olden times
39
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there was no passage through as one went forward. For the end of the rock
reaches to the very stream of the river, affording no room for those who travel that
way to pass by. So the men of ancient times constructed a tunnel at that point, and
made there a gate for the place.42
The assault that Martinus and Ildiger levied against Petra is a solid example of utilizing
natural topographical elements. Their forces fired missiles against one the gates but it had little
effect because it was mostly closed up by the Gothic defenders. They proceeded thereafter to
make their way up the mountainside and threw stones from the high ground that they attained.
This, however, did not entirely bother the Goths and they retreated into their homes which
rendered the Byzantine forces unable to harm their opponents. The Byzantine forces remedied
this by breaking off “large pieces from the cliff and, many of them pushing together, hurled them
down at the houses.”43The intent of this particular effort was not simply to damage the houses or
the inhabitants. These falling rocks instead aroused fear in the defenders: “And wherever these
[rocks] in their fall did no more than just graze the building, they yet gave the whole fortress a
considerable shock and reduced the barbarians to great fear.”44 The Gothic garrison surrendered
shortly after this barrage and was mostly removed. Martinus and Ildiger posted a small garrison
of Byzantine troops at Petra and joined John at Rimini, arriving before the Gothic host led by
Wittigis.
The siege of Rimini marked the beginning of the struggle for Ravenna. Three cities
blocked the path to Ravenna: Rimini, Urbinus, and Auximus. Rimini, being situated on the
Adriatic coast, offered the Byzantines a port that would shorten the trip for reinforcements
traveling from Constantinople if they held it. John’s speech in Procopius’ narrative conveys the
42
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topographical challenges that lay before him because the Romans were hemmed in by sea and
land.45 Urbinus (modern-day Urbino) was another city that the Ostrogoths controlled and
blocked the way. Auximus (modern-day Osimo), however, was the last city under Ostrogothic
control to fall prior to the assault on Ravenna. This particular city was styled as the key to
Ravenna by Procopius through the mouth of the Ostrogoth garrison commander: “And the
writing was as follows: ‘When you appointed us, O King, for the garrison of Auximus, you said
that you had placed in our keeping the keys of Ravenna itself and your kingdom.’”46 What this
suggests is that the city both a literal and metaphorical defense for Ravenna: Take the city and
Ravenna would fall shortly afterwards.
Second Siege of Rome
During the siege of Rome from 546 to 547 AD, Belisarius made his last contribution to
the Gothic Wars in defense of the city. Procopius provides the details of Belisarius’ labors:
Gathering stones which lay close by, he threw them one on top of
the other, regardless of order, without putting anything at all
between the stones, since he had neither lime nor anything else of
the sort, but caring only that the face of the masonry should be
preserved, and he set a great quantity of stakes on the outside. Now
he had previously, as it happened, dug deep trenches around the
entire circuit-wall, as stated in the previous narrative.47
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Coates-Stephens refers to a number of surviving towers and sections of the Aurelian Wall which
may possibly contain the re-used bricks which Belisarius and his troops were able to utilize after
Totila, leader of the Goths in 546 AD, destroyed about a third of the Aurelian Wall’s circuit.48
The Byzantines also made an effort to control other areas around the region, including the
area of Portus. This area, however, was not fully secure during the second siege of Rome.
Procopius reports that the force of Belisarius heading towards Rome was ambushed by Gothic
troops waiting for them.
The Final Siege of Rome
The Mausoleum of Hadrian featured prominently in the final siege that Totila levied
against Rome. With the city on the verge of capture, several of the defenders took up residence
in the tomb of the emperor Hadrian. At this point, Totila had already pierced the greatest strength
of the defenders, the Aurelian Walls. He achieved that by means of subterfuge, convincing
several Isaurian guards in the service of the Byzantines to let in the Goths through the Porta
Asinaria. But this last effort offers interesting ideas. First, the Mausoleum of Hadrian is, at this
point, certainly no longer a place respected as a burial ground of former Roman emperors.
Second, even 10 years after the first defense of Rome during the Gothic Wars, the Mausoleum of
Hadrian remained a defensive position in the city.49
Conclusion
There were some preconceived notions about the security of Rome prior to the siege of
536- 537. Procopius writes that the city itself was too large to be defended. The people of Rome
argued that it was logistically untenable, the terrain poor for defense, and the city walls too far
around to cover effectively. Yet this speaks to the character of Belisarius and the Byzantine

48
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defenders portrayed by Procopius. The odds were clearly against the Byzantine forces in Rome,
but nevertheless there was an effort to hold the city. The defense of Rome was successful in 537
– 538 but failed in the subsequent sieges. The use of existing topographical elements obviated
the need for constructing new fortifications and Belisarius recognized that. Totila, conversely,
understood the capacity to which the walls and topography permitted a defense of Rome and so
worked to take apart the walls. The effort of the Byzantine defenders can still be appreciated
today because the Aurelian Walls have survived for almost seventeen centuries and remain a
symbol of their endurance and fortitude.
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